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Jane Mansbridge (Harvard)
“The Fallacy of Tightening the Reins”1
Im gegenwärtigen Diskurs über die Reformbedürftigkeit demokratischer Systeme wird versucht, der Un-
zufriedenheit der BürgerInnen mit Vorschlägen zur stärkeren Kontrolle der RepräsentantInnen zu begeg-
nen. Dies soll auf der einen Seite durch eine Betonung der elektoralen Verbindung, auf der anderen Seite
durch eine bessere Kontrolle der Bürokratie durch die gewählten RepräsentantInnen erfolgen. Die Über-
betonung der Wahl stößt jedoch auf Schwierigkeiten: Wahlen können Quelle von Desinformation und
Auslöser für populistische Politik sein, deren einziges Ziel der Wahlerfolg ist. Darüberhinaus ist im ver-
breiteten Modell der gyroskopischen Repräsentation die Verweigerung der Wahlunterstützung eine
leere Drohung. Vielmehr muss eine Form der narrativen und deliberativen Accountability und eine
Betonung der non-elektoralen Mechanismen angewandt werden, um die Responsivität des politischen
Systems zu erhöhen und das demokratische Defizit zu verringern. Kommunikation und politische Bildung
werden als Ergänzungen elektoraler Kontrolle präsentiert.
Keywords: gyroskopische Repräsentation, demokratisches Defizit, Accountability,
BürgerInnenversammlung
representation, gyroscopic, democratic deficit, accountability, citizens assembly
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1. Introduction
In both Europe and the United States, a sig-
nificant recent response to dissatisfaction with
democracy has been to try to tighten the reins
by tightening the electoral connection.
Instead of tightening the reins  increasing
control of representatives by voters through the
electoral connection and control of bureaucrats
by elected representatives  I suggest strength-
ening in other ways the relationship between
constituent and representative, constituent and
bureaucrat.
I first argue that empirically the electoral
connection is too weak to sustain all the demo-
cratic hope we have invested in it. I then sug-
gest, on the theoretical plane, that the standard
theory of accountability through electoral sanc-
tions ignores the frequently practiced and
normatively justifiable forms of gyroscopic
representation and gyroscopic bureaucracy
that in their pure form do not employ this form
of accountability. These forms instantiate instead
a little recognized selection model of princi-
pal-agent relations, which relies less on account-
ability through sanctions than on deliberative
accountability. Deliberative accountability in
turn requires communicative processes that go
farther than elections. I suggest several non-elec-
toral mechanisms of direct citizen action de-
signed to enhance deliberative accountability,
increase government responsiveness, reduce the
democratic deficit, and enhance the representa-
tive process. Although these ideas are merely
suggestive, they illustrate the larger point that
we need to look beyond elections to sustain de-
mocracy. Non-electoral mechanisms ideally
would supplement relations based on control
through threat of sanction with relations of mu-
tual communication and education.
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2. Flaws in the electoral connection
As societies grow more complex and inter-
dependent, many of their interactions, otherwise
best left to decentralized market mechanisms,
create increasing numbers of collective action
problems that require for their solution ever
more intrusions into natural-seeming interac-
tions, including the market. To help solve these
problems, government grows. But as the inter-
actions become more complex and the polity
grows in size, the link between citizens, repre-
sentatives, and bureaucracies becomes attenu-
ated. Citizens feel, correctly, that they have less
control over the important decisions that affect
their lives.
One strong and standard reaction to these
developments has been to try to tighten the reins,
to make the lines of control stronger between
citizen and representative, representative and
bureaucrat. A major problem with this strategy
is that the electoral process, the putative source
of control, itself has costs. Electoral campaigns
are poor sources of information, distort infor-
mation, and sometimes create perverse incen-
tives for politicians.
In countries with considerable illegal politi-
cal corruption there are obvious reasons not to
rely heavily on the electoral process. In coun-
tries whose electoral systems are significantly
bound up with clientelism and patronage, there
are also reasons not to rely too heavily on the
electoral process for the instantiation of
democrazy Yet even in countries where there is
relatively little illegal corruption or clientelism,
we in the profession of political science and as
members of the public may have made a fetish
of the electoral process. We have put too much
stress on electoral accountability, when the elec-
toral process is itself somewhat flawed and tight-
ening the electoral reins has counterproductive
effects.
Because there are good arguments for the
electoral connection, I would never suggest re-
placing it. I suggest only that we stress elec-
tions less and supplement them with other forms
of citizen interaction with the state. Elections
are irreplaceable in democracy at the very least
because parties organize opinion and crystallize
issues in the electoral process, electoral cam-
paigns discover and bring out issues and infor-
mation that the other side would like to hide,
and, most importantly, votes for representatives
have some effect on political outcomes and are
thus deeply legitimating.
So some gains in reducing the democratic
deficit can be made by reforming electoral proc-
esses, particularly when existing processes em-
body biases. I shall not, however, address these
reforms here. I shall argue instead that the elec-
toral connection itself is a weak reed on which
to rest the government of and by the people
that is said to be characteristic of democracy. I
restrict my remarks here to the relatively suc-
cessful, relatively uncorrupt, relatively unclien-
telistic advanced democracies, suggesting that
even here the electoral connection is problem-
atic.
Why? First, the electoral process is an ex-
tremely blunt instrument. The vote is a binary
tool (yes/no) and gives a binary signal, much
like the market (buy/dont buy). As Albert
Hirschmann (1970) points out, a binary signal
(exit/no exit) communicates much less in-
formation than voice.
Second, electoral campaigns embody incen-
tives that encourage distortion. As television and
constantly improving production techniques
accustom the viewer to a shorter and shorter
attention span, political ads use shorter and
shorter soundbites, which distort what citizens
can learn from the campaign. As techniques of
reframing information in ones own favor be-
come so well developed that citizens become
cynical, they assume that they cannot trust any-
thing, and that very cynicism keeps them from
absorbing new information. As campaign strat-
egists advise candidates not to respond to their
opponents attacks on the grounds that any re-
sponse directs media time and attention to the
grounds on which the candidate is weakest, citi-
zens rarely hear the explanation for the actions
that are attacked. In the 2004 Presidential elec-
tion in the United States, for example, Senator
Kerry never responded fully to the Swift boat
lies. President Bush never responded to Kerrys
accusation that his administration was giving
incentives to outsource jobs. Future empirical
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research, based on content analysis of candidate
speeches, campaign ads, media coverage, and
citizen surveys, will probably demonstrate that
the United States is an outlier on this dimension
of failure to respond, but varieties of such fail-
ure are nevertheless endemic to political cam-
paigns. For this reason among many others, cam-
paigns provide little opportunity for education,
either by representatives of citizens or by citi-
zens of representatives. The recent United States
Presidential campaign, for example, spent 718
million dollars and the entire electoral campaign,
including Congress, cost more than 1.5 billion
dollars, yet the citizenry was not much better
informed at the end. One would expect multi-
party systems to have more capacity to inform
at least the members of their own parties of the
information relevant to the issues. Yet, as is well
known, political campaigns in general often fail
to inform the citizenry and even distort the facts
that citizens eventually remember. Distortions
created by soundbites, spin, and modern cam-
paign techniques pervade the electoral process.
Third and finally, the electoral connection
creates perverse incentives for politicians both
in and out of office. For politicians in office,
particularly in single-member districts with
poorly disciplined party systems, the re-election
imperative creates strong incentives to seek
short-term gains and neglect the long term. Rep-
resentatives also have little capacity to explain
complex issues to the citizenry. They thus have
strong incentives to avoid policies that can be
attacked with a soundbite or a distorting adver-
tising campaign.2  Context is critical. But even
in Europe, where party-list systems make rep-
resentatives more responsible to parties, which
then have somewhat longer time-horizons, the
electoral connection still tempts politicians and
parties toward the short term. In addition, for
politicians not yet in office, candidate-centered
systems generate a perverse selection for indi-
viduals with sufficient ambition to put up with
a grueling campaign, the capacity to withstand
the abuse of self and family, and even (in the
United States) the willingness to spend much
of their time fund-raising. Except in the most
protected party-list systems, campaigns also
usually select for people who want to win. In
some contexts, campaigns select for people who
can dispense money or other forms of patron-
age.3
In clientelist systems the incentives are dif-
ferent, but here too the electoral connection does
little in the way of educating the public about
important policy questions, selecting public-
spirited individuals for office, and providing
incentives to act in the long-run public good
when in office.
I conclude, therefore, that the electoral con-
nection, at least as presently established, is a
necessary condition for good representation, but
not a sufficient condition. As a vehicle for rep-
resentation it has many flaws.
Yet in spite of these flaws, many suggestions
these days for reducing the democratic deficit
place even more emphasis on the electoral con-
nection. In the EU, for example, common sug-
gestions for reducing the democratic deficit in-
clude making parties more central in the Euro-
pean Parliament, making elections for Parlia-
ment more important, perhaps turning the Coun-
cil into a cabinet accountable to the Parliament,
and perhaps instituting an elected European
president. These reforms all focus on strength-
ening the electoral connection, despite elections
being too blunt an instrument to convey much
accurate information, electoral campaigns en-
couraging distortion, the re-election incentive
undermining concern for the long term, and the
electoral process sometimes selecting against
those who would bring primarily a concern for
the public good into office.
3. Flaws in the practice of control and
sanction
Another problem with tightening the elec-
toral connection involves human motivation.
Simply put, people do not do their best work
when they are tightly controlled. This is as true
of a legislator or bureaucrat as of any of us.
Psychological research has established that
in general extrinsic motivation drives out intrin-
sic (Deci et al. 1999). In one of many well-rep-
licated experiments, subjects   were asked to
solve some three-dimensional puzzles in three
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sessions.  In the first session, all subjects worked
on the puzzles without pay.  In the second ses-
sion, one set of subjects was paid for the com-
pletion of each puzzle.  In the third session, dur-
ing which the experimenter left the room, those
who had been paid earlier for doing them did
fewer puzzles than those who had not been paid.
The extrinsic motivation of the pay had driven
out the intrinsic satisfaction of doing the puzzle
(Deci 1971).
So too with representatives and bureaucrats.
People work less well under the whip than when
they like what they are doing or think the goal
toward which they are working is good.4
Advocates for increased political account-
ability rarely take these features of human psy-
chology into consideration. They often act as if
the threat of sanctions had no cost in the
motivations of, say, elected representatives.
Similarly in the civil service, the more some-
one in public service is micro-managed, the
more that person has to report back on every-
thing to a superior, the more tightly the reins
are held, on average the less good work that
person will do  if that person is already inter-
nally motivated to do good work.
These considerations do not mean that we
should advocate eliminating control by voters
of elected representatives or control by elected
representatives of the bureaucracy. They mean
only that more accountability in the sense of
more monitoring and sanctioning does not al-
ways produce better performance.
4. Flaws in the practice of transparency
A similar analysis holds for transparency,
that familiar cure for the ills of democracy ad-
vocated by both the public and political science.
Although some transparency is good  indeed
necessary  for democracy and in many cases
these days we need more transparency, more
transparency is not always better.
In contexts where the elected representatives
and appointed civil servants are in general com-
petent and honest, after an important minimum
in transparency each increase creates obvious
costs in efficiency, as each agent fills out reams
of paper that allow every step in a process to be
reconstructed for public inquiry. That ineffi-
ciency produces a concomitant cost in motiva-
tion, as more of each day is spent creating a
paper trail and less on the job that optimally the
agent intrinsically wants to do. But the greatest
cost of transparency is often that many negotia-
tions, great and small, are best conducted be-
hind relatively closed doors. Negotiators need
to be able to say things for which they will not
be held accountable to their constituents, be-
cause they need to show those with whom they
are negotiating that they understand their posi-
tions. The much-maligned European comitology
system, for example, has produced reasonably
good results, given the large numbers of factors
the decision-makers have had to take into ac-
count. It has forged bonds among the members
of the civil service of the many nations of the
European Union. The compromises have been
hammered out not by taking positions in pub-
lic, which encourages grandstanding, but by
building friendships and trust among the nego-
tiators and creating packages that are eventu-
ally acceptable to all participants in that nego-
tiation.5
When transparency in the process has costs
like these, we should favor not extreme trans-
parency in process, but instead transparency in
procedures, information, reasons, and the facts
on which the reasons are based. In the Supreme
Court of the United States the deliberations and
the negotiations around the decisions are secret,
but the facts on which the decisions are based
and the reasons for the decisions are public.
When EU bureaucrats have been asked to be
more transparent, they have in most cases re-
sponded appropriately in this more communi-
cative fashion  giving reasons, explanations
and facts, and improving notification, rather
than opening their processes to public monitor-
ing (Lodge 1994; also Keohane/Nye 2001;
Magnette 2003, 151). As we shall see, however,
these features of one-way narrative account-
ability need to be supplemented with systems
that provide more two-way deliberative
accountability, with lines of communication
that are open, accessible, and initiated by both
sides.
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The greatest dangers in much of the current
EU are not that the bureaucrats will be incom-
petent or dishonest but first, political pressure
(that they will succumb to pressures from ma-
jor political interests), second, self-serving bias
(that they will come to think their own agencys
mission more important than an informed mem-
ber of the public would think it, and so promote
that mission at the expense of other public
goods), third, the exclusion of some interests
and perspectives from the process as a whole,
and fourth, the general unwillingness of bureau-
crats to consult those affected. It is important to
curb these tendencies. Yet it is not clear that the
best way to curb them is through the standard
model. That model makes the electoral link be-
tween constituents and representatives carry the
burden of conveying the right information to
the bureaucrats to offset self-serving bias. It also
allocates to the representatives alone the job of
monitoring and sanctioning the bureaucrats to
counteract bias, prevent undue external pressure,
and insure full participation of all interests.
5. Flaws in the theoretical model
Problems arise not only in the practice of
the electoral connection and control through
monitoring and sanctions, but also in the theory
behind this practice.
5.1.Introducing a selection model
of principal-agent relations
A frequently overlooked selection model
of principal-agent relations applies in the small
but significant set of cases with two character-
istics. First, the potential agent, for some exog-
enous reason, wants internally to act much as
the principal wants that agent to act. Second,
the principal has good information about the
internal reasons (or the pattern of past action
from which internal reasons may be deduced)
of the potential agent. When these two charac-
teristics are present, it is more efficient for the
principal to invest in selecting that agent and
then leave the agent relatively unmonitored and
unsanctioned than to select an agent who needs
more continual and extensive monitoring, sanc-
tioning, and inducement.
Although this selection model has great
power in some real-world cases, it does not ap-
pear significantly in principal-agent theory as it
has been developed up to this time.6
5.2.Gyroscopic versus induced
representation.
The rational choice model of political rep-
resentation, which is now the standard model in
political science, relies on traditional sanction-
based principal agent theory.  It is an induced
rather than a selection model. In this model
the voter (the principal) exerts power over the
representative (the agent), getting the representa-
tive to do what the representative would not oth-
erwise do through the threat of sanction or the
use of force. The model assumes that absent the
voters power, the representative would act dif-
ferently. Because the voter induces the repre-
sentative to have preferences and take actions
that he or she would not otherwise have, I call
this form of representation induced represen-
tation.7
In practice the constituent-representative
relationship often works on the selection model.
This alternative has a normative status at least
equal to the normative status of traditional in-
duced principal-agent theory. It has the further
advantage that, in the opinion of several politi-
cal scientists, it accurately describes much ac-
tual interaction between voter and representa-
tive in the United States (Kingdon l981,
Bernstein l989, Stimson et al. l995, Fearon
1999) and I believe also in Europe. In this model,
which I call gyroscopic representation, be-
cause in it the representative acts like a gyro-
scope (ein Kreisel) setting its own direction, the
voter selects a representative but does not in-
duce any change in that representatives prefer-
ences.8  In the pure case of gyroscopic repre-
sentation (and no case is pure), the voter exer-
cises no power at all over the representative.
Instead, the voter exercises power over the po-
litical system by putting into that system a rep-
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resentative who already has, internally, a cer-
tain direction. The voter thus affects not the
behavior of the representative but the behavior
of the legislature, and through the legislature
the rest of the polity.9
Gyroscopic representation is not intrinsically
elitist. It should therefore not be confused with
the trustee form of representation, derived
from the writings of Edmund Burke. Trustee
representation is only one kind of gyroscopic
representation, the least democratic kind, and
rarely prevails today, at least in the United States.
The word trustee implies hierarchy, even ar-
istocracy. It suggests that some individuals are
wiser, more far-seeing, more educated and cul-
tured than others, and that only these individu-
als should rule. A trustee is one to whom
something is entrusted, one trusted to keep or
administer something or one holding legal ti-
tle to property which he must administer for the
benefit of a beneficiary10, with the strong im-
plication that the trustee knows better what is
good for those for whom he or she administers
the trust than do those individuals themselves.
A financial trust is often created on the pater-
nalistic assumption that it is better if the benefi-
ciary never gets his or her hands on the funds at
all. By contrast, a gyroscopic representative is
not set above his or her constituents. Gyroscopic
representation need have no hierarchical, aris-
tocratic, or undemocratic implications. Voters
choose among candidates whom they predict
will act in certain ways, and place these indi-
viduals rather than others in the political sys-
tem. Although the individuals they select are
usually more educated than the constituents, the
constituents often look for representatives who
in many other respects are just like them-
selves. The gyroscopic representatives often
present themselves as being just like their
constituents. Edmund Burke did not.
Edmund Burkes classic Speech to the Elec-
tors at Bristol (1774) also suggests, and the term
trustee implies, that the representative will act
for the good of the nation as a whole, not merely
the good of the district. Gyroscopic representa-
tion does not require this implication, although
the public-interested gyroscopic representative
(of whatever political persuasion) is by far the
most common kind. A voter could place in the
system a gyroscopic representative who would
not act for the good of the nation as a whole but
would only always vote for a particular policy,
such as benefits for a particular group, that the
voter might desire for purely self-interested rea-
sons. The concept of a gyroscopic representa-
tive is in theory indifferent to the reasons (pub-
lic-spirited or not) motivating the representative.
It does, however, provide the democratic frame-
work through which we may understand the
independent stance of a public-spirited repre-
sentative.
Past democratic theory has tended to treat a
representative who acts independently, and is
not influenced by others attempts to exercise
power over him or her, as in some way undemo-
cratic. As we have seen, the trustee concept was
in its origin quite undemocratic, being based on
the aristocratic concept that the representative
as trustee came from a class of people who knew
better than others what was good for the coun-
try. But gyroscopic representation is the demo-
cratic substitute for the trustee concept. In
gyroscopic representation the voter remains in
charge. But in this model the voter does not
change the behavior of the representative (and
may well not even want to change the behavior
of the representative). The voter wants only to
change the behavior of the legislature.
Gyroscopic representation couples intrinsic
motivation on the part of the representative with
control (over the legislature, not the representa-
tive) on the part of the voter. It can often get
voters more of what they prefer than can the
standard, induced-preference model, because in
the gyroscopic model the motives of the repre-
sentative are more aligned with those of the voter
than in the standard, induced preference model.
In a horse race you are more likely to win when
you select a horse that wants to run than when
you rely on the whip to make the horse run. So
too a constituent may be far more satisfied with
an honest, competent representative who wants
intrinsically to pursue the same kinds of poli-
cies that the constituent wants than with a rep-
resentative who is only seeking reelection and
thus responds only to the promise of votes or
the threat of withdrawing those votes.11
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Importantly, in this alternative to induced
representation the reins can be completely slack,
or even non-existent. There need be no reins at
all on the gyroscopic representative. If the rep-
resentative is driven from the inside, believing
in some set of policies, and if the voter has an
accurate understanding of the direction in which
the representative, driven from inside, will go,
then the voter need do no more than place this
representative in the political system and go
home. No control is needed, because the repre-
sentatives motivation is intrinsic, not extrinsic.
Although the model of gyroscopic represen-
tation was derived from a U.S. context, the se-
lection model itself is context-free. The open
question is how the selection model more
broadly and gyroscopic representation more
specifically illuminate both European national
systems and EU governance. In European sys-
tems of representation, voters as principals of-
ten select parties to represent them on a gyro-
scopic basis. Party platforms, which indicate the
direction the gyroscope will travel, result not
only from active party members desires to gain
votes but also from their inner gyroscopic
political convictions. Parties undoubtedly vary
in the degree to which their platforms continue
to follow their activists inner gyroscopes when
voter sentiment has changed against them. The
gyroscopic versus induced dimension is in-
tended to enhance our capacity to analyze these
changes and refusals to change, moving beyond
the simple concepts of political ideology or po-
litical preference.
The normative criteria appropriate for gy-
roscopic representation are first, good system-
wide deliberation at the time of election, and
second, relative ease in both maintaining ones
selected representative in office or removing that
representative and placing another in the sys-
tem. In gyroscopic representation, the better the
information and the deliberation at the very first
election, the lower is the likelihood of the vot-
ers needing or wanting to replace that repre-
sentative in the future. If the quality of delib-
eration is excellent in the first election of a rep-
resentative and the choice is therefore good,
there is in this model no reason to think that the
constituents would ever want to replace that rep-
resentative. He or she can carry on until retire-
ment.
Although gyroscopic representation rests on
selection, it departs at its core from the model
advanced by Joseph Schumpeter (1981), whicj
is entirely induced. The gyroscopic representa-
tive is internally driven, while in Schumpeters
model the politician as entrepreneur offers on
the market whatever he or she thinks the public
will want and will therefore buy.
The crucial problem in both the individual
theory (and to a lesser degree the party theory)
of gyroscopic representation is the very elec-
toral system whose flaws I described earlier.
Electoral systems that fail to convey accurate
information harm gyroscopic systems of repre-
sentation as much as any other. Moreover, only
if voters can add and remove gyroscopic repre-
sentatives relatively easily at appropriate points
will those voters be able to exercise their demo-
cratic power over the system. Incumbent privi-
leges that impede removal and term limits that
prevent maintenance block the effective use of
that power. Gyroscopic representatives often do,
however, care intrinsically for the long term in
ways that counter some tendencies of the elec-
toral system. This is their important advantage.
The civil service also benefits from a gyro-
scopic bureaucracy. Some theories of democ-
racy condemn extensive delegation from an
elected legislature or executive to an appointed
bureaucracy. But in our own lives each of us
frequently exercises our freedom to delegate. I
am not clear what theory of democracy forbids
the demos from doing in this respect what we
as individuals want and need to do. Bureaucrats
will always make law as well as applying it;
such relative autonomy is inherent in efficient
delegation. When the bureaucrats are relatively
honest and competent for exogenous reasons 
as they mostly are in the UK and parts of the
EU, particularly in Scandanavia  and when the
process of delegation follows justifiable proce-
dures, it makes sense in motivation and effi-
ciency, and is normatively justifiable as reason-
able democratic delegation, to let them work
with a minimum of monitoring and sanctions,
and fight the sources of distortion largely out-
side the electoral process.
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Of course every system needs some moni-
toring of both elected officials and bureaucrats.
But that monitoring need not be systematic and
on-going. Matthew McCubbins and Thomas
Schwartz (1984) distinguish between fire-
alarm and police patrol oversight, contend-
ing that it is more efficient for individual citi-
zens and interest groups to send in the alarm
when they come across wrongdoing in the bu-
reaucracy rather than have their representatives
engage in continual monitoring. The same might
be said of the elected representatives themselves
when exogenous factors, such as internal com-
mitment, produce a high probability of honest,
competent behavior.
Moreover, both among elected representa-
tives and the appointed civil service, what or-
ganizational theorists call network  or hori-
zontal, or professional  accountability can
often substitute effectively for vertical ac-
countability, that is, the accountability of the
standard model.12 If members of a network have
a strong enough internal commitment to the
norms of their profession, or even if those mem-
bers have only a self-interested concern for the
reputation of their network, they will have an
incentive to monitor and sanction the behavior
of others in the network to keep potential de-
fectors up to network standards. The ambitions
of one section of the bureaucracy will also check
in some respects the ambitions of others. These
networks of horizontal accountability, along
with recruitment systems and larger social
norms, help produce honesty and competence
outside the electoral system. When these proc-
esses are functioning effectively, the amount of
external monitoring and sanctioning needed is
only the minimum that experience shows is nec-
essary to prevent the unraveling of a system of
motivation based primarily on internal incen-
tives and horizontal accountability. That is of-
ten not very much.
4.3. Deliberative accountability.
In the principal/agent theory derived from
economics, the accountability of an agent de-
pends on the principals capacity to monitor and
sanction  particularly sanction. Bernard Manin,
Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes write that
governments are accountable if voters can
discern whether governments are acting in their
interest and sanction them appropriately (1999,
40). They add, In a pure accountability model,
voters use the vote only for one purpose, which
is to sanction the incumbent (1999, 44). James
Fearon spells out the relation: In the jargon of
economic theory, relations involving account-
ability are agency relationships in which one
party is understood to be an agent who makes
some choices on behalf of a principal who has
powers to sanction or reward the agent (1999,
55). A definition making sanctions central is also
commonplace in everyday life. As Robert Behn
puts it: When people seek to hold someone
accountable, they are usually planning some
kind of punishment (2001, 4).
An earlier understanding of accountability,
however, stresses giving an account (rendre
compte, Rechenschaft abgeben). Not only a
numerical but also a narrative account is inher-
ent in the concept of accountability. It is not just
a matter of the principal monitoring and sanc-
tioning; it is a matter of the agent showing, ex-
plaining, and justifying (Behn 2001, 4; Philp
2004, 12). I call this process narrative account-
ability. Seeing the constituent-representative
relation only in terms of making the representa-
tive subject to sanctions diverts attention from
this central communicative process of giving
an account  explaining and justifying ones
action.
Ideally, however, this process of accountabil-
ity should be not just narrative, in the one-way
sense of giving an explanation, but deliberative,
in the two-way sense of both principal and agent
having input and response.
For this purpose, new institutions are re-
quired, beginning from below.
5. Citizen action
Regarding elected representatives I conclude
that if the quality of citizen deliberation at elec-
tion-time is good and if the electoral system
makes it relatively easy both to maintain repre-
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sentatives in office and to remove them, then it
is normatively quite consistent with democracy
to leave them alone. Let us dislodge,
normatively, the standard single-minded focus
on voter control of representatives, with its
across the board opposition to incumbency and
obsession with turnover in office. When an ini-
tial selection has been a good one, neither voter
control of the representative nor turnover are
necessary for good democratic representation.
As for the civil service, if they are doing a good
job, leave them alone too. As a demos, we are
permitted to delegate.
Yet a democracy that is plausibly by and
of the people cannot consist only of a system
in which voters select good representatives and
leave them alone. Even if we were somehow
able to create a world of perfectly public-inter-
ested elected representatives and appointed bu-
reaucrats, all working on intrinsic motivation,
doing everything they could to further the pub-
lic interest without even self-serving bias, prac-
tical and normative problems would still arise.
Practically, not always being connected to local
knowledge, these representatives and civil serv-
ants would make mistakes. Normatively, their
very capacities would tend to incapacitate the
people they served, who would be encouraged
to leave everything to them.
By contrast, active citizenship fosters pub-
lic capacities. Although it is hard to measure
such things empirically, an active role in poli-
tics very probably generates in the citizenry
greater information, critical intelligence, politi-
cal efficacy, political self-respect, and perhaps
even mutual respect among the citizens them-
selves.13  Moreover, because even under gyro-
scopic representation and bureaucratic delega-
tion citizens are the ultimate decision-makers,
who choose the gyroscopic representatives and
pass judgment on the civil service, active citi-
zenship is the ultimate guarantor of both indi-
vidual interests and the common good.14  To play
an active role in the democracy, constituents
should ideally not only vote but also have an
on-going relationship with the political process
between elections. They should have a continu-
ing role in educating the representatives and
bureaucrats about the reality that they, the
constituents, are experiencing and a continuing
opportunity to educate themselves both about
their own reality and the reality that the repre-
sentatives and bureaucrats see.
So, in the large, representative democracies
require at least three processes. First, they need
selection processes that, at least to some degree,
foster and choose elected representatives and
bureaucrats who intrinsically want to pursue the
public interest. As political scientists we have
not looked carefully enough at our institutions
to ask what features in what contexts encour-
age and discourage the selection of individuals
with public spirit and integrity. Second, as a
continual although optimally somewhat periph-
eral process, democracies require a modicum
of monitoring and sanctioning, as in the classic
principal-agent model, with some degree of in-
duced preferences, to prevent systems based on
integrity and concern for the public good from
unraveling. And third, democracies need mecha-
nisms by which, even when public-spirited gy-
roscopic representatives and civil servants are
working well, citizens can enter the process,
educate their elected representatives and their
civil servants, and learn themselves more about
their own interests and the issues.
How is this process of continual mutual com-
munication and education to take place? How
can we achieve deliberative accountability?
This is the time and place for institutional
innovation. Here I sketch a few possibilities,
all of which I advance only experimentally.
Only practice will show which of these, or of
other similarly directed innovations, actually
produce an active, better informed, more effi-
cacious, intelligently critical, self-respecting
and mutually respecting citizenry and, perhaps,
better collective decisions as well. Only prac-
tice will show how particular innovations in-
teract with various forms of electoral represen-
tation.
One set of reforms, while neither delibera-
tive nor aimed at the common good, neverthe-
less helpfully decentralize sanctions from the
electoral process to the point of service. Exten-
sive recent efforts at reinventing government
(Osborne/Gaebler 1992) to increase competi-
tion, flexibility, and customer service have
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created one form of non-electoral accountabil-
ity both in the United States and Europe. De-
spite the virtual absence of deliberation from
these processes and their treatment of citizen as
consumer (features that have produced some
scorn among normative theorists), they do gen-
erate some communication and mutual educa-
tion, both through complaint and response at the
point of service and through the binary signals
of buy/dont buy. By shifting some power to
the citizen, these reforms usually produce
greater bureaucratic respect for citizens per-
ceived needs and personal dignity. To some de-
gree they inform bureaucrats of citizens real
needs. And the microscopic bursts of empow-
erment they produce may conceivably also set
the stage for more active citizen engagement on
policy matters.
Other more deliberative reforms could build
on existing institutions. The office of ombuds-
man, for example, although usually seen as act-
ing only to preserve citizen rights could also
enhance deliberative accountability by encour-
aging citizens to take issues to the ombudsman
as a group and receive in return not only a po-
tential redress of grievances but also an expla-
nation of why those grievances had been al-
lowed to come about.  A similar innovation
would facilitate group petitions through the ex-
isting right to petition in the European Union
and on the national level.
To open existing neo-corporatist institutions
to active citizenship and deliberation, Phillipe
Schmitter (1995) has suggested a far-reaching
reform that would give each citizen at regular
intervals the capacity to cast, say, five vouchers
for one to five organizations of the citizens
choice (open to all interests but restricted to non-
profits with democratically selected leaders,
transparent finances, etc.) to receive public funds
from the general budget and to represent the
interests and ideals that the citizens wanted to
promote most vigorously in the years before
their next choice. This innovation, which some
small state might introduce experimentally,
would make neo-corporatist (associative) insti-
tutions more inclusive and less static, more re-
sponsive to changing citizen interests and pref-
erences.
The late EU constitution and many polities
provide for citizen initiatives. But these initia-
tives now trigger only referenda, and are rarely
deeply deliberative. Instead, citizen initiatives
could be put to new uses.  First, citizen initia-
tives could trigger mandatory public hearings,
in which the elected representatives or appointed
bureaucrats responsible for an unpopular policy
would be required to face questions and objec-
tions from the public and to explain their rea-
sons for these policies.
Second, citizen initiatives could trigger citi-
zens assemblies randomly selected citizens,
modeled loosely on the ancient Greek system
of the lot. Sometimes called citizens juries
or deliberative polls, versions of these assem-
blies have already been used in the Common-
wealth countries, in Denmark, and to a lesser
degree in the United States (Luskin et al. 2002;
Crosby 2003; Hansen 2004; Citizens Assembly
2004).15
In this innovation, if sufficient numbers of
citizens did not like a parliamentary vote or a
ruling from Brussels, they could collect signa-
tures and demand a representative citizen as-
sembly on the topic. The process of demanding
a citizens assembly would also give citizens
an incentive to learn more about the issues.16
Other innovations might also enhance citi-
zen deliberation (see Barber (1984) on two-stage
referenda, Ackerman and Fishkin (2004) on
deliberation days, and Fung and Wright (2003)
on participatory budgets).
The particular form that these suggestions
have taken is less relevant than their aim, which
is to provide deliberative counterweights to the
greater autonomy that a gyroscopic norm affords
representatives and civil servants. Thus this
analysis aims first to establish the normative
democratic basis for relative autonomy among
elected representatives and bureaucrats selected
for, among other things, their public interest
motivation. Second, it aims to add to present
systems a greater responsiveness to informed
public desires, a greater respect for public
knowledge and perceptions among representa-
tives and bureaucrats, a greater public voice in
decisions, and a greater capacity for mutual edu-
cation, communication, and deliberation be-
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tween state actors and the public. In all of these
suggestions for innovation, therefore, the arrow
of control and information bypasses the elec-
toral system to go directly from the citizens to
those responsible for a policy. Ideally, causality
becomes in many cases two-way, with power
and information traveling in both directions.
This ideal of democracy is deliberative rather
than aggregative, educative rather than static. It
respects all three crucial sets of actors in the
political world  the citizens, the elected repre-
sentatives, and the appointed bureaucrats  and
asks what settings will encourage them to de-
velop their capacities in ways that foster critical
intelligence and concern for the public good.
6. Potential problems
Several problems arise with supplementing
the electoral connection in these ways.
The most important is the possibility of un-
dermining that electoral connection. Competent
bureaucracies responding to citizens as consum-
ers, neo-corporatist institutions whose members
are elected through vouchers, and extra-elec-
toral participatory decision-making bodies such
as citizens assemblies can all undermine the
electoral connection, making elected assemblies
less significant. This might not be a major prob-
lem in European countries like Germany and
Sweden, where current electoral systems pro-
mote many parties and consequently both power
and political responsibility are already relatively
diffuse. Such systems might be able relatively
readily to accommodate a few more decision-
making or advisory entities. They are also rela-
tively consensus-oriented. But where, as in the
UK, electoral systems promote two-party
majoritarian democracy, power is concentrated
in the executive, and political responsibility is
allocated through a responsible party system,
it is far harder to accommodate separate centers
of power. In the UK and also in France, any
source of political power outside the electoral
system, particularly if aimed at consensus, un-
dermines both the conflict-based political cul-
ture that expects the majoritarian government
to impose its political program without compro-
mise and the tradition of généralité, in which
the state represents the general interest with no
intermediaries (Schmidt 2005).
In the EU itself, the Parliament is already
weak. In this context it is not clear whether in-
stituting other routes of citizen influence would
risk rendering the Parliament irrelevant or, on
the contrary, give citizens a taste of power that
would invigorate European citizenship and in-
directly strengthen the Parliament.
Some experimentation should help reveal
how serious this problem is in different contexts
 and in what contexts we might expect direct
forms of participation to substitute for the elec-
toral connection rather than supplementing it or
stimulating greater participation in electoral
politics. The dialectics between the electoral
system and any new mechanisms for direct citi-
zen relations with the civil service need to be
explored. How would they complement each
other and how conflict? How would the citizens
interest voiced through the new procedures be
reckoned in elected institutions? In working out
these issues, it is important to remember that I
am not advocating here more citizen control over
either the representatives or the civil service.
That is the common rhetoric today. To the con-
trary, I am arguing that in circumstances when
for exogenous reasons the political representa-
tives and civil service are already honest, com-
petent, and acting in the overall directions that
the public desires, what democracies need is not
more citizen control but more citizen capacity
to initiate deliberative accountability. Bureau-
crats need to understand more how what they
do affects the lives of the citizens on the ground,
and they need to hear that from the citizens them-
selves. For their part, citizens need to hear the
ideas of the bureaucrats in contexts where the
citizens can pursue their questions, pressing
deeply and interactively into the responses.
Elected representatives also need to be brought
more in touch with the lives of their constitu-
ents, particularly when what they do differs from
what their constituents want.
A second problem involves the question of
how these new institutions might come about.
Elected representatives now have few incentives
to institute measures that bypass the electoral
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process, especially given the expense of many
of these new mechanisms. In Porto Allegre,
Brazil, one political party campaigned and won
office on a platform containing a promise to
establish participatory institutions such as the
eventual participatory budget. That party, be-
ing on the left, also benefited from the subse-
quent greater political participation of the poorer
citizens in electoral politics. In British Colum-
bia, an innovative prime minister who had him-
self been frustrated by the inequities of the prov-
inces electoral system, advocated establishing
a citizens assembly to make recommendations
for change.
When an issue is too hot to handle, elected
representatives might have an incentive to em-
power a citizen assembly, instead of using the
courts or referenda to avoid responsibility, as
some political systems now do. In another pos-
sible interaction with the electoral system, citi-
zens voices expressed through some of the new
mechanisms might be taken up by political par-
ties or individual representatives. We see this
pattern with certain referenda today. Under-
standing the potential interactions of elected
representatives with the new mechanisms of
deliberative accountability that I suggest will
require considerable further trial and error, and
observation.
A third problem is perceived legitimacy. In
part, legitimacy will depend on how thoroughly
the citizens who do not themselves participate
in these supplementary institutions identify with
and perceive themselves as represented by those
who do. When the representation by other citi-
zens is in fact not biased, as in randomly se-
lected citizens assemblies, the media play a
crucial role in legitimating the result.  As the
demands of the market drive newspapers and
the television news into ever shorter, more cyni-
cal, and less policy-oriented treatments of is-
sues (Patterson 1993), the media shies away
from even reporting the results of non-
conflictual deliberative processes. Thus in Brit-
ish Columbia, many citizens heard little of the
arguments for and against the new electoral sys-
tem that their citizen assembly had recom-
mended and little of the process in the assem-
bly itself. Partly as a result, the assemblys rec-
ommendation fell three percentage points short
of the 60 percent approval on the referendum
that it required to become law. Other mecha-
nisms of direct citizen influence and delibera-
tive accountability are also likely to get lost in
the entertainment and information glut. These
mechanisms must therefore be consciously tied
into the media and consciously publicized
through local media, associational news, and
civil society networks, including the internet.
The most important such mechanisms need
budgets and personnel earmarked for dissemi-
nation.
Only further analysis and experimentation
can determine which of the suggestions made
here for increasing active citizenship are fanci-
ful and which have practical possibility. Yet,
given the flaws in the electoral process, reduc-
ing the democratic deficit requires looking not
only at the electoral connection but beyond it,
to other lines of mutual communication between
citizens and representatives, citizens and bureau-
crats. Social class differences sometimes stand
in the way of equal communication of this sort,
perhaps more in Europe than in the US. In all
democracies, however, politicians and bureau-
crats are currently tempted to think that citizens
have little to offer directly to the governing proc-
ess. Institutions of deliberative accountability
might have a positive effect both on this per-
ception and on the reality.
At present, the EU benefits from the most
elaborate of coordinative discourses  (but)
suffers from the thinnest of communicative dis-
courses between political leaders and the pub-
lic (Schmidt 2005). These suggestions are aimed
at strengthening those communicative dis-
courses.
7. Conclusion:
This analysis has reviewed the many flaws
in the electoral connection  among others, that
it is a blunt instrument, encourages distorted
information, undermines legislators concern for
the long term, selects against many who would
bring primarily a concern for the public good
into office, and supplants intrinsic with extrin-
sic motivation.
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The electoral connection has, of course, even
more flaws in politically corrupt and clientelistic
systems.
In part because of these flaws, reducing the
democratic deficit depends less on tightening
the electoral connection  in the sense of mak-
ing the representatives more responsive to ac-
tual or potential sanctions from the voters and
making bureaucrats more responsive to sanc-
tions from the representatives  and more on
making an informed public itself the judge of
good policy, by, among other things, improving
deliberative accountability. The critical factor
is the quality of two-way communication be-
tween representatives and constituents and be-
tween bureaucrats and constituents.
Reducing the democratic deficit depends on
multiplying the forms of representation for
citizens, while maintaining and improving the
efficacy of government by fostering, selecting,
and encouraging gyroscopically public-spirited
representatives and civil servants. When for ex-
ogenous reasons certain potential representa-
tives already want to act the way the citizens
want them to act, and when citizens have
sufficient information to predict those inner
motives, it is rational for the citizens to select
those individuals and place them in the system,
thus economizing on the costs of monitoring
and sanctioning. The same holds in the civil
service.
As everyone realizes, improving the quality
of the representative relationship enhances
democratic legitimacy. But rather than simply
promoting more control  by the people of their
elected representatives directly and their ap-
pointed representatives indirectly  we should
be looking for a better quality of representation
in all levels of government, in which the people
have a better chance to be heard, understood,
and have an impact on the thinking of all of their
elected and appointed representatives, while
conversely, those representatives have a better
chance to be heard, understood, and have a pro-
ductive impact on the thinking of the constitu-
ents.
The American philosopher John Dewey
once wrote, on the topic of the saying, the cure
for the ills of democracy is more democracy:
The old saying that the cure for the ills of democ-
racy is more democracy is not apt if it means that
the evils may be remedied by introducing more
machinery of the same kind as that which already
exists, or by refining and perfecting that machinery
(Dewey 1994, 144).
That insight is worth repeating today.
NOTES
1 I thank the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study
for providing the time to work on this topic; Archon
Fung, Daniele Archibugi, Christina Lafont, the
members of the Austrian Political Science Associa-
tion who commented on the address, and the review-
ers for this journal for suggestions that helped me
clarify my thought; and Mai Bunagan and John Fang
for research assistance.
2 See Mansbridge (1999) for the U.S. example of na-
tional catastrophic health insurance, which sev-
eral members of Congress first voted for and then
against after the insurance industry had mounted a
campaign against it, telling a researcher (Bianco
1994) that if they had the time, they could explain
to their constituents why the bill was good for the
nation, but in the short time the television gave them,
even combined with their own mailings and meet-
ings with groups of citizens, they could not explain
their position against the advertisings distorting
oversimplifications.
3 For empirical political scientists, electoral systems
that combine proportional representation by list with
single-member districts create an opportunity to in-
vestigate the kinds of representatives that each kind
of electoral system selects and the incentives for
representatives in each system to communicate with
constituents in ways that illuminate policy issues.
4 Philp (2004, 22) makes a congruent point, arguing
that an agent who regards his conductas a mat-
ter of honour should not be held to account in a way
that is itself dishonouring or shaming. See also
Goodin (1982) on moral incentives, Anechiaro and
Jacobs (1996, 202: if public employees are treated
like second- or third-class citizens, they will act ac-
cordingly), and Self (1972, 277-8: The tensions
between the requirements of responsibility or ac-
countability and those of effective executive action
can reasonably be described as the classic dilemma
of public administration).
5 As Naurin (2004) points out, the costs of transpar-
ency are particularly great in potentially integra-
tive or win-win solutions. For the first
conceptualization and naming of integrative solu-
tions see Follett (1942).
6 For a new second generation approach that stresses
selection, however, see Besely/Coate (1997) and
Besely (2005).
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7 This category combines what I have previously
called promissory and anticipatory representa-
tion (Mansbridge 2003).
8 Mansbridge (2003); also Philp (2004) on integrity-
based vs. compliance-based systems.
9 The voter also has power over the legislature in the
induced model, through affecting the behavior of
the representative. The point of gyroscopic repre-
sentation is that the voter can have power over the
legislature without also affecting the actions of the
representative through positive inducements or the
threat of sanction.
10 Websters Third International.
11 Note that I have described a pure type. No actual
representative is either purely gyroscopic or purely
induced. Any primarily gyroscopic representative
will undoubtedly change some features of his or her
behavior, even if unconsciously, in order to be
elected or reelected. Any primarily induced repre-
sentative will undoubtedly have at least a vestigial
gyroscopic core.
12 See Goodin (2003) for the particular appropriate-
ness of network accountability in the third sector
of non-profit institutions, on the grounds that a form
of accountability based on praising or shaming and
shunning (12) will work most effectively among
actors motivated by the public good. See Keohane
and Nye (2002) on network accountability in inter-
national organizations. As Goodin (2003, 41) points
out, networks can also function as conspiracies
against the public and cozy cabals covering one
anothers incompetence; for these reasons some
external monitoring and sanctions are always nec-
essary.
13 For problems in measurement see Mansbridge
(1999); for recent evidence of the effects of active
citizenship see Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell (2002),
Gastil, Deesse and Wieser (2002).
14 See Naurin (2004) for the appropriate caveats.
15 The legal authority of these assemblies derives from
the elected representatives or appointed bureaucrats
who establish them. Because their participants are
not electorally accountable, their role has until now
been advisory to other bodies, or, in the case of the
British Columbia Citizens Assembly on the elec-
toral system, to the citizenry at large through a ref-
erendum.
16 In the EU, for example, citizens would have to dis-
cover where in the EUs multilayered system the
decision to which they objected was taken. In 1995,
Klandermans and colleagues (2001) found that only
a quarter of the farmers surveyed in the Netherlands
and less than five percent of those in Gallacia named
the EU as having responsibility for their situation as
farmers.
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